REUSE! MODULARITY! Among all computing domains, Internet computing has long been an example of the application of those two software engineering mottos.
Web applications are formed from reusable components all over the software stack. Both on the client and server side, Web-specific libraries and frameworks let creative developers quickly wrap up rich applications. Massive reuse happens on both the client side (in the browser) and server side (in the datacenter). For instance, jQuery is a popular client-side library written in JavaScript, and Spring is a widely used server-side technology. The open source philosophy and ecosystem is one of the backbones of this massive reuse in Web applications.
In addition, some very modular Web applications have become extremely successful. For instance, according to our empirical data, more than 100,000 websites use WordPress, a blogging and content management system whose architecture is extremely modular. Through plugins, users can easily tweak or extend any part of the application. With the help of high-quality documentation and a vibrant community, users can instantly install thousands of plug-ins on any server running WordPress.
On one hand, reuse and modularity favor someone writing the next killer application. On the other hand, they greatly facilitate the next massive BOBE (break once, break everywhere) attack. A tension exists between reuse and dependability. Should we give up one or the other? Not necessarily.
To reconcile these two development aspects, we propose using software diversification in multiple
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WORDPRESS, A FRAGILE MONOCULTURE?
WordPress is a Web content management system that supports massive customization through plug-ins. Although the vibrant WordPress community keeps increasing the number and diversity of plug-ins for all possible tasks, we observe a paradoxical trend toward a monoculture of some popular plug-ins. This monoculture is a potential threat to the WordPress ecosystem, particularly when the plug-ins have a defect. As an example of a massive threat, 21 percent of the 106,412 sites we sampled use the Jetpack plug-in, which has an SQL injection vulnerability.
However, you can exploit WordPress plug-ins' natural diversity to mitigate this threat. For example, you can replace Jetpack with WP Symposium or Disqus, which offer compatible functionalities with completely different implementations. This example shows that, despite the emergence of monocultures in the WordPress ecosystem, the community actively continues to develop diverse solutions. This provides fertile ground to experiment with the automatic diversification of WordPress sites by exploiting the natural diversity of functionally similar plug-ins to break this fragile application monoculture.
All results about the monoculture in WordPress are available at http:// diversify-project.eu/data. developers rely on leaky abstractions and are more concerned about time-to-market and useful features for their clients than securing their code. This monoculture might present even more risks than the OS monoculture, which grew over long periods of time with security concerns in mind.
Consider WordPress. In the 500,000 most popular websites (according to www.alexa. 
Multitier Software Diversity
Web applications typically comprise server-side and client-side code working in concert. The client-side code is written mostly in JavaScript and runs in a browser. The server side is a software stack comprising an OS, a webserver, libraries, frameworks, and application-specific code.
Software diversity has long been promoted to enhance software dependability (see the sidebar, "Related Work in Software Diversification"). Since the seminal work of Frederick Cohen 3 and Stephanie Forrest and her colleagues, 4 researchers Windows OS has long been considered a monoculture on desktop machines. The term "monoculture" comes from agriculture, where research has shown that exploiting the same crop species over large areas is a bad practice. Similarly, software monoculture has a negative connotation. 1 BOBE attacks are the main problem: with a large monoculture, attackers can exploit flaws and common failure modes on a massive scale.
The OS and database monocultures have been known for a long time, 2 and both are key components of the general computing infrastructure. However, Internet computing has introduced application monoculture. The novelty is that this monoculture appears in applicationlevel code (libraries, frameworks, and the application itself), where components of Web applications. We identify key enablers for effective software diversification, especially at the application-code level. Our vision is that you can combine different software diversification strategies, from deploying multiple vendor solutions to fine-grained code transformations, to provide various forms of protection.
Application Monoculture
Reuse and modularity are key for liberating creativity and entrepreneurship in the Internet world. However, this bright world has a darker side. The problem is that reuse and modularity also help create a new form of massive-scale monoculture.
The concept of a software monoculture refers to a computing environment dominated largely by one software solution. To deal with application monoculture, software diversification must address software layers beyond assembly code. Our approach is unique in that it diversifies the application-level code (for example, the application's business logic), focusing on the technical layers in Web applications. Webserver deployment usually adopts a form of the Reactor architecture pattern, for scalability purposes. Multiple copies of the server software stack, called request handlers, are deployed behind a load balancer, which dispatches all incoming requests. Currently, all handlers are deployed as clones, but this kind of architecture provides a natural setting for diversification.
Multitier diversification is the simultaneous diversification of several application software components. This approach can rely on both natural software diversity and automatic diversity. Natural software diversity designates diverse software modules that provide equivalent functionalities and are developed by different communities or companies. For example, there's a natural diversity of Java virtual machines (JVMs). You can exploit this by simultaneously deploying some request handlers that run the IBM JVM and others that run the Oracle JVM.
RELATED WORK IN SOFTWARE DIVERSIFICATION
Frederick Cohen described 14 code diversification techniques to be combined to protect OSs. 1 Stephanie Forrest and her colleagues emphasized the need to build diverse computing systems and suggested diversification based on code manipulation. 2 Since these seminal works, several approaches have implemented automatic-diversification transformations at the machine-code level and have combined them to increase software system dependability. Each kind of transformation targets a specific kind of vulnerability, and several research projects have started combining them to get more complete protection. These integrated software diversity techniques are particularly interesting regarding multitier diversification.
For example, Sandeep Bhatkar and his colleagues thwarted code injection attacks by integrating various forms of randomization. 3 For instance, they randomized base addresses of memory regions to make the objects' addresses unpredictable, permute the order of variables in the stack, and introduce random gaps in the memory layout. Matthias Jacob and his colleagues targeted tamper resistance through superoptimization to identify semantically equivalent instruction sequences and through other transformations that change the set of instructions and operands. 4 The Genesis project mitigated return-to-libc attacks and code injection by implementing a virtual machine that integrated calling-sequence diversity and instruction set randomization through software dynamic translation. 5 Chenxi Wang and her colleagues obfuscated critical software modules in survivability infrastructures by combining control-flow flattening and introduction of aliases. 6 For more references, see Per Larsen and his colleagues' recent survey. 7 Hamed Okhravi and his colleagues have summarized the different levels of moving-target defenses. 8 
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Application-level automatic diversity is provided by code transformations that generate diverse versions of some application components. Examples include method body intermixing, 3 randomizing the database query language, 5 and synthesizing sosies (program variants that exhibit the same functionality but are computationally diverse, with different control flow or dataflow). 6 The diversification of application code should provide diverse failures and vulnerabilities in webserver deployment. Thanks to the multiplicity of request handlers running on a webserver, we can simultaneously deploy multiple combinations of diverse software components. If one handler is hacked or crashes, the others should still be able to process client requests. Some components' natural diversity exhibits diverse failure modes. For example, some vulnerabilities are present only in the Oracle JVM (vulnerabilities CVE-2014-4244 and CVE-2014-2490).
Meanwhile, automatic diversity can produce large numbers of local changes in the code, which affect specific kinds of vulnerabilities. For example, method body merging can change the binary code's layout to prevent reuse of a single buffer overflow attack or monkey patching. The randomization of SQL queries can mitigate SQL injections. File system paths or URLs can be diversified in the source code to prevent certain forms of settings hijacking. Finally, sosies, by changing the computation flow, can modify vulnerabilities such as lack of input validation or business logic vulnerabilities.
Proof of Concept
We developed and diversified a prototype Web application that uses common, off-the-shelf components. The application is MDMS (MarkDown Content Management System), a multi user blogging system. (All the code for this experiment is at http:// diversify-project.github.io.) MDMS lets users view, create, edit, and delete blog posts. It's implemented in JavaScript and runs on top of the RingoJS server-side framework. RingoJS is written in Java and complements the Rhino open source JavaScript engine. A Redis distributed database stores the application data. Figure 1a illustrates this application stack. The architecture reflects the characteristics of many Web applications: a server-side scripting language, a server-side framework, and a NoSQL database.
We deployed MDMS on request handlers, arranged behind a load balancer, following a typical Reactor pattern to let the application elastically scale over time. Following current practices, our initial deployment was as follows. All handlers provided the same RingoJS environment, running on top of an identical JVM. This usual way of deploying the Reactor pattern resulted in nondiversified deployment of MDMS (see Figure 1b) . This was an application monoculture: all servers behind the load balancer were clones, from the OS level up to the libraries and application software.
We injected diversity into MDMS at four levels: virtual machine, JVM, JavaScript library, and deployment infrastructure (see Figure 1c) . Diversification at each level exploits either natural diversity or novel automaticdiversity techniques.
OS Diversification
MDMS has no dependencies on any particular OS, so we could use a mix of different distributions of Linux, BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution), and Windows. In our experiments, we randomly deployed MDMS on Windows and Linux virtual machines.
JVM Diversification
The three major suppliers of JVMs are IBM, Oracle, and OpenJDK (Open Java Development Kit), each having several versions. Although the OpenJDK and Oracle JVMs share the same code base, the latter has some built-in commercial and open source tools that the former doesn't. These differences are significant enough to leave vulnerabilities in only the Oracle version. In our experiments, RingoJS alternately ran on Oracle-jdk1.7.0_45 (Sun/Oracle), IBM-Java-x86-71 (IBM), and Java-7-openjdk (GNU).
JavaScript Library
This layer is the RingoJS framework. This is an open source component with no competing functionally equivalent alternatives. To diversify this level, we used our technique for automatically synthesizing sosies. 6 This synthesis transforms the original program through statement Automatic diversity can produce large numbers of local changes in the code, which affect specific kinds of vulnerabilities. deletion, addition, or replacement. Using this diversi cation technique, we synthesized 70 RingoJS sosies for MDMS.
Deployment Diversi cation
Through the cloud and its deployment interface, MDMS can be randomly deployed in two geographically distant datacenters (in Europe and the US). Our experiments used the Amazon cloud and a private cloud running an LXC container (Linux container). We used CloudML (Cloud Modeling Language) 7 to model and automatically deploy the application between different cloud providers and OSs.
Overall Deployment
We have two versions of the OS, three diverse JVMs, 70 Rhino so sies, and two datacenters. Because the layers are mostly independent, we can combine the alternatives for each layer to create an exponential number of possible server deployments. For example, our setup could run 840 diversied webservers to deliver MDMS. We deployed 17 instances of the server stack behind an Nginx webserver. In particular, we deployed 17 versions of the RingoJS library, a functional component that has never been diversi ed with other approaches. We designed eight functional test scenarios to validate MDMS's global functionality. We checked that these scenarios 
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actually executed the diversi ed part of RingoJS-that is, that the modi ed statements in the sosies executed. All scenarios passed correctly on the original, nondiversi ed server and on the diversi ed server. Yet, some of the modi ed (added, removed, or replaced) statements in RingoJS executed thousands of times. (The max was 148,000 times for a sosie in the setLP method, which the JS interpreter uses to handle switches.)
The diversi ed system is available at http://cloud.diversify-project.eu. This result demonstrates the ability to generate considerably diverse software by combining natural and automatic diversity in a realistic Webbased architectural setting.
Insights from Application Diversity
This proof of concept demonstrates both the feasibility of multitier diversi cation in Web applications and the challenges of operationalizing this vision. We discuss three of them here.
Automatic Diversi cation
Automatic diversi cation is the key to true diversity. For example, the automatic synthesis of 70 sosies was the main reason for the 840 different MDMS handlers. However, few solutions exist for automatic diversi cation of application-level source code because it requires transformations that are on the edge between functional correctness and quality of service, 8 which might not preserve the original program's semantics. Recent research on unsound program transformations opens the way for such novel, massive diversi cation techniques. This research includes Martin Rinard and his colleagues' work on loop perforation, 9 Westley Weimer and his colleagues' work on code transformation for automatic patching, 10 and our work on sosie synthesis. 6 To explain these transformations' potential effects, we look at the RingoJS sosies, whose control ow or data ow differ from the original RingoJS. This diversi cation has different causes. An attribute can be assigned a different value than in the original program, with no visible impact on the application. Some method calls can be removed, eliminating a complete part of the program's computation, yet the program still provides the service. These cases occur either because the changes have no side effect (for example, the variable is never used) or, more interestingly, because they occur in plastic zones-parts of the computation that tolerate variations. These zones can appear in algorithms that compute some form of heuristic or in redundant code. Plastic zones are interesting from a security viewpoint because they indicate zones in which some potentially vulnerable code can be removed.
Code replacement has a different impact. For example, Figure 2 illustrates a statement replacement that adds an input validation. In general, such reduction of the input space, if it still provides the service, is good for security.
Eventually, we need to understand how to navigate the functional neighborhood of programs to provide different degrees of applicationlevel diversity while maintaining functional compatibility.
Integrating Multitier Diversi cation into Development
The second challenge is integrating multitier diversi cation into Web software engineering practices, to master its impact and leverage its full potential for dependable Web applications.
First, we can deploy the diverse handlers in different ways. In our experiment, we picked 17 of the 840 handlers and deployed them to provide spatial diversity. Then, the system sent incoming requests to one of the handlers, round-robin. Several other strategies are possible; for example, we could
• pick a single handler and deploy it 17 times; • constantly deploy new versions of the handler, providing temporal diversity to form a movingtarget defense; 11 or • use the diverse handlers in a multiversion fashion, with a voting mechanism.
However, we need to understand what strategy best ts a given dependability goal. Second, diversi cation affects distribution and maintenance. For example, when a third party must sign an application's binary code, the production of millions of diverse variants becomes a challenge. One 
Run-Time Environments
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about the number of handlers it sends a request to, detect potentially vulnerable handlers, and stop using them or decide to replace them. We also need architectures that allow the composition of multiple levels of diversity. We must manage application state consistency between diverse handlers and support dynamic reconfiguration and deployment of software in a distributed infrastructure (using a virtual machine, containers, and software modules). The MDMS architecture natively supports multitier diversification. The diverse request handlers store data in a Redis database (a distributed NoSQL solution) instead of a file system. We adapted the NGinx load balancer with specific distribution and recovery policies when a handler fails. We experimented with both Kevoree (http://kevoree.org) and CloudML (http://cloudml.org) to manage deployment of software modules on diverse and distributed virtual machines. Both frameworks provide utilities to seamlessly handle the heterogeneity of technologies for virtual machines (for example, Vmware and VirtualBox), system containers (such as docker, lxc, and jails), and app containers (such as servlet, android, and osgi). They provide flexible configuration models with built-in architecture model exploration and the ability to orchestrate coherent, transactional reconfiguration of the platform, infrastructure, and service levels. We plan to experiment also with Mesos to manage virtual machines or container deployment. 
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